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INTRODUCTION
On April 8, 2014, authorities arrested Frederick J. Moore, a
member of Maine’s Passamaquoddy Tribe, for illegally harvesting
juvenile eels in New York State.1 Moore was charged with three fel-
ony counts and two misdemeanors for poaching animals2 scarcely
the size of a thin shoelace.3 The fish, called an elver, is the juvenile
stage of the North American eel, and a pound of these tiny creatures
has sold for as much as $2000 in recent years.4 In fact, a well-equip-
ped elver fisherman can make $10,000 in one night or over $100,000
in one season.5 Despite the high price, elvers are not especially rare
in the United States.6 In fact, they are fairly common, but their
migration goes relatively unnoticed by the millions of people living
in the populous cities on the East Coast.7 
The gold rush for elvers has brought attention to a previously
lowly fish, and in the process amplified preexisting federal, state,
and tribal tensions that have not been heavily explored in existing
scholarship. This Note focuses specifically on Maine, the state with
the largest elver fishery8 and where the fish is at the center of a
1. See Joe Lawlor, Passamaquoddy Tribe Member, Former Representative, Charged with




3. See Press Release, Middle Level Commissioners, Elvers Galore (July 14, 2014), http://
www.sustainableeelgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Elvers-at-St-Germans-PS-press-
release-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZL4-AHME].
4. See id.; Lawlor, supra note 1. Eels go by a variety of names depending on their life
stage. In an early stage, eels are called glass eels because of their clear color. See generally
JAMES PROSEK, EELS 116-17 (2010). When eels begin to show black pigment, which occurs
shortly after they enter the freshwater ecosystem, they are called elvers. Id. Eels can look so
different at different stages of their life that they have been confused in the past for different
species. Id. at 117-18. For the sake of simplicity, this Note will refer to all juvenile eels as
elvers.
5. See Annie Sneed, Glass Eel Gold Rush Casts Maine Fisherman Against Scientists, SCI.
AM. (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/glass-eel-gold-rush-casts-maine-
fishermen-against-scientists/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQ6-U7VY]. To understand why such a tiny
fish is so valuable, see infra Part I.A.
6. See PROSEK, supra note 4, at 119.
7. See id. at 116.
8. The effect of this little fish on the Maine economy has been significant, as the fishery
had a value of nearly $33 million in 2013. ME. DEP’T OF MARINE RES., HISTORICAL MAINE
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conflict at the nexus of conservation, jurisdiction, and tribal rights.
The source of this conflict is the Maine Indian Claims Settlement
Act of 1980 (MICSA), the legislation that outlines the relationship
between Maine’s natives and the State,9 and which Maine’s tribes
have challenged in the elver context for its effect on aboriginal
fishing rights and tribal sovereignty.10 That a scarce resource would
bring attention to these issues should not be surprising—the distri-
bution of natural resource rights has in many ways defined the rela-
tionship between the United States and American natives since the
country’s early days.11
In this case, elvers are a way to explore the growing tension
between Maine’s native tribes and the State over MICSA. Although
the tribe’s argument for greater fishing rights is legally weak,12 the
fight over elvers reveals weaknesses and uncertainties in MICSA,
especially regarding tribal rights. The cloud of uncertainty sur-
rounding MICSA interferes with Maine’s ability to effectively
manage other resources. These problems require a solution, for the
mounting tension between the tribes and the State is unlikely to
abate.13 Therefore, despite hardening stances on both sides of this
ELVER LANDINGS, http://www.maine.gov/dmr/commercialfishing/documents/elver.table.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GFT-JTVZ] (last updated Feb. 19, 2016) [hereinafter HISTORICAL MAINE
ELVER LANDINGS]. This figure represented 6 percent of the total value of Maine’s commercial
fisheries in 2013. ME. DEP’T OF MARINE RES., MAINE COMMERCIAL LANDINGS, http://www.
maine.gov/dmr/commercialfishing/documents/AnnualAllSpecies.table.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JE9T-T9U8] (last updated Feb. 19, 2016) (dividing the nearly $33 million in elvers by the over
$540 million in total value of fish in Maine for 2013).
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See generally ME. INDIAN TRIBAL STATE COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL SALTWATER FISHERIES CONFLICT BETWEEN PASSAMAQUODDY AND THE STATE OF
MAINE (June 17, 2014), http://www.mitsc.org/documents/148_2014-10-2MITSCbook-WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VK33-U4NA].
11. For example, the Trail of Tears began when gold was discovered in northwest Georgia.
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1831). More recently, the United States
entered into a settlement agreement with Alaska’s native tribes for a historic sum of money
when it became apparent that the tribes’ land claim affected an area of the state with rich oil
fields. Gigi Berardi, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)—Whose Settlement
Was It? An Overview of Salient Issues, 25 J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 131, 131, 133 (2005).
Fishing rights are even a common source of international conflict. See, e.g., MARK KURLANSKY,
COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 162-66 (1997) (describing a series
of three wars between Iceland and the United Kingdom over fishing rights that were simply,
but aptly, named the “Cod Wars”).
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See infra Part III.C.
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issue, the time has come for Maine to reassess MICSA and find a
solution that would make the boundaries of the law more certain
and effective not only for its fisheries, but also for other regulatory
areas. Failing to do so could cause excessive, effectively unregulated
fishing of a species with significant conservation concerns.
This argument is important for four reasons. First, as the story
at the beginning of this Note highlights, the tension between tribal
and governmental authorities is not strictly a Maine issue.14 The
man charged with poaching, Frederick J. Moore, was a Maine native
teaching New York natives how to fish for elvers.15 Like Moore, the
New York tribal official took issue with all state-imposed restric-
tions on the tribe’s traditional activities.16
Second, although much scholarship exists concerning such issues
in the Pacific Northwest,17 there is not much written about tribal is-
sues on the East Coast.18 This Note examines an underexplored area
of native law that could prove useful for tribes across the nation.
Third, understanding the scope and nature of MICSA is impor-
tant even if conservation concerns lead to the fishery’s closure.19 For
Maine, learning how to regulate elvers effectively could be useful in
preventing the overexploitation of other fisheries, of which Maine
has many.20 In addition, it is not unfathomable that the rags-to-
14. See Lawlor, supra note 1.
15. See Bill Trotter, Tribal Official Facing Charges in NY Vows to Take Elver Debate Be-
yond Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, http://bangordailynews.com/2014/04/23/news/state/passa
maquoddy-official-facing-charges-in-ny-vows-to-take-elver-debate-beyond-maine/
[https://perma.cc/6M53-2LMX] (last modified Apr. 23, 2014, 6:36 PM).
16. See Lawlor, supra note 1.
17. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & James Brunberg, “Not Much Less Necessary ... Than
the Atmosphere They Breathed”: Salmon, Indian Treaties, and the Supreme Court—A Centen-
nial Remembrance of United States v. Winans and Its Enduring Significance, 46 NAT. RES.
J. 489 (2006) (discussing a landmark Supreme Court case that restored tribal fishing rights
on the Columbia River); Jeremy David Sacks, Culture, Cash or Calories: Interpreting Alaska
Native Subsistence Rights, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 247 (1995) (discussing the use of culture as a
basis for subsistence laws).
18. Only one scholar has explored MICSA, and that research addresses MICSA’s
jurisdictional problems. See infra Part III.D. 
19. See infra Part I.C (discussing the closure of most elver fisheries in the United States).
20. Maine’s most notable fisheries, currently and historically, include cod, lobster, and
salmon, among many others. See Historical Maine Fisheries Landings Data, ME. DEP’T 
MARINE RES., http://www.maine.gov/dmr/commercialfishing/historicaldata.htm [https://perma.
cc/6TGB-G47B] (last updated Feb. 19, 2016).
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riches story of the lowly eel could repeat itself for another junk
fish.21
Lastly, although MICSA is unique to Maine, this Note’s discus-
sion about how to balance the rights of the tribes with a state’s regu-
latory authority will provide useful guidance for federal and state
fisheries regulations. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background to
the current controversy, including the reasons why the elver is par-
ticularly vulnerable to overharvesting. The overall success of this
important species hinges on the ability of Maine’s legislature to
balance economic and environmental concerns. Part I also discusses
Maine’s tribes, with particular attention paid to the Passamaquod-
dy, the most vociferous opponent of the elver regulations. Part II
discusses the legal history of the elver fishery in Maine. This Part
will pay close attention to the interplay between federal, state, and
tribal regulatory authority.
Part III explores MICSA and discusses the Act’s provisions, state
and tribal interpretations, and the challenges to its authority.
Lastly, Part IV explores potential solutions to the problem, drawing
from Maine’s unique history as well as successful solutions imple-
mented in other states. This Note will discuss the optimal solution
to the problem: using the conflict over the elver fishery to strike a
new compromise between the natives and the state that would clari-
fy and reiterate MICSA. Such a deal would satisfy pressing needs
for both parties: Maine would achieve greater oversight, and the
natives would be able to participate at a greater level in a highly
lucrative fishery or receive comparable consideration.
21. The boom for elver is similar to the boom in Maine’s urchin fishery during the 1980s
and 1990s. See Bill Trotter, Elver Fishery Boom Generates Memories of 1990s Urchin Bust,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Apr. 14, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/04/14/
business/elver-fishery-boom-generates-memories-of-1990s-urchin-bust/ [https://perma.cc/BS
C8-2ZBM]. Like elvers, urchins became lucrative when Pacific stocks declined. See id. The
harvest has declined dramatically since the 1990s. See id.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the Lucrative Elver Fishery
The great demand for eel does not come from the United States,
but rather from foreign countries, particularly those in Asia and
Europe.22 In Japan, the eel’s oily meat is a prized sushi center-
piece;23 in several European countries, it is a smoked delicacy.24 Al-
though both of these places have native populations of eel, pressure
on their fisheries has been so great that the fish is endangered.25
The United States has capitalized on the enormous international
demand for eel largely because Americans have not historically con-
sumed significant amounts of eel.26 As a result, commercial fisher-
men in the United States have, until recently, engaged in a limited
commercial harvest,27 making the United States a prime harvesting
ground.28
In order to satisfy the world demand for eel, fishermen catch the
fish in their juvenile stage.29 Eel are then shipped to Chinese fish
farms where they are raised to marketable size.30 Once big enough,
the farmers sell them to distributors around the world.31
22. See PROSEK, supra note 4, at 119.
23. In fact, the Japanese value eel most for use in kabayaki unagi, a culturally significant
summertime meal. See id. at 120.
24. RICHARD SCHWEID, CONSIDER THE EEL 17 (2002).
25. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Seechrist, 27 Pa. Super. 423, 426 (Super. Ct. 1904) (“[E]els
... are not in either class of game or food fish.”); Commonwealth v. Shupp, 32 Pa. C. 178, 178
(Ct. of Quarter Sess. of the Peace 1906) (summarizing the case and noting that “eels ... are not
described as either game fish or food fish.”); see also PROSEK, supra note 4, at 119 (“[T]he eel
had been largely ignored as a food fish in modern America.”). A bit more historical probing
reveals that this was not always the case. See MOURT’S RELATION 97 (Henry Martyn Dexter
ed., Press of Geo. C. Rand & Avery 1865) (“Squanto went at noone to fish for Eeles, at night
he came home with as many as he could well lift in one hand, which our people were glad of,
they were fat & sweet, he trod them out with his feete, and so caught them with his hands
without any other Instrument.”).
27. See PROSEK, supra note 4, at 118-19 (stating that commercial fishing for elvers devel-
oped in the late 1970s and peaked in the mid-1990s).
28. See id. at 119.
29. See id. at 120.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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With the increased pressure on the elver fishery, however, come
well-founded worries that the American eel may soon become en-
dangered.32 The imperfect knowledge of eel biology has compounded
these concerns.33
B. The Mystery of Eel Biology
Despite the fact that people have harvested eel for a long time,34
there are still things about eels that leave scientists baffled.35 In
particular, not much is known about the fish’s breeding habits.36
What is known is that all eels in rivers on the East Coast are born
in the Atlantic Ocean and migrate to the sea to spawn.37 Specifical-
ly, the eel migrates out of its home waters to the Sargasso Sea in the
middle of the Atlantic Ocean.38 No one has witnessed an eel spawn,
but scientists have narrowed the area where they believe the activi-
ty occurs to this calm, quiet two million square mile stretch of ocean
named after the thick green mats of sargassum seaweed that
periodically cover its surface.39 Aside from eels and seaweed, the
Sargasso is also known as the home of the Bermuda Triangle.40 If
finding a downed aircraft in this area has proved elusive, pinpoint-
ing exactly where a fish no bigger than a yardstick41 spawns has
proved all but impossible. Nevertheless, the spawn occurs every
year and, in the spring, young elvers return to rivers across the East
Coast of the United States.42
The imperfect knowledge of eel biology is the reason why eel must
be caught at the elver stage and raised in fish farms: it is very dif-
32. See infra Part I.C.
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. See SCHWEID, supra note 24, at 69-71 (discussing the ancient Greeks and their taste
for eel).
35. The work of Professor James McCleave, however, has significantly improved the quan-
tity and quality of research on the eel. For a list of his works, see James McCleave, UNIV. OF
ME., SCH. MARINE SCI., http://www.umaine.edu/marine/people/profile/james_mccleave [https://
perma.cc/5XFN-4VML] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
36. See PROSEK, supra note 4, at 133-34.
37. See SCHWEID, supra note 24, at 14-15.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 15.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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ficult, if not impossible, to commercially breed eel in captivity.43 In
addition, farming eel from a young age ensures that more market-
sized eel can be produced for less cost than shipping live, full-sized
eel overseas.44
C. Current Conservation Status of the Eel
Against the backdrop of an incomplete scientific knowledge is a
highly successful and valuable commercial harvest that, in its pre-
sent state, threatens the long-term success of the species. Historical
evidence reveals, however, that elvers were once a common sight in
the spring and could be seen migrating slowly upstream by the mil-
lions.45 There was an abundance of eel throughout the eastern
United States, including up the Mississippi and into the Midwest.46
Today the eel population is “at or near historically low levels,”47 and
evidence shows that eel harvests have declined drastically since the
1970s.48 
There are four primary reasons for the decline. The first culprit
is dams. Dams make the spring migration of elvers more difficult by
impeding the ease with which they can swim upstream.49 In addi-
tion, adult eels, returning to the sea to spawn in the fall, often
become caught in hydroelectric turbines.50 
The second problem is overfishing. Catching too many eel during
the fall and spring migrations has a significant negative impact on
the eel population.51 Eel are particularly vulnerable when caught as
elvers because their numbers are concentrated at that stage, and
harvesting methods are very effective.52 
43. See PROSEK, supra note 4, at 118-19; SCHWEID, supra note 24, at 17.
44. See PROSEK, supra note 4, at 120.
45. See id. at 117-18.
46. See id.
47. American Eel, ATLANTIC STS. MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, http://www.asmfc.org/
species/american-eel [https://perma.cc/WM6D-THYQ] (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
48. See id. (“From the 1970s to the mid-1980s, American eel supported significant com-
mercial fisheries, with landings ranging from 2.5 to 3.6 million pounds. Landings dropped to
1.6 million pounds in 1987 and have remained at low levels, ranging from 1.5 million to
700,000 pounds since then.”).
49. See PROSEK, supra note 4, at 252-53.
50. See id.
51. See American Eel, supra note 47.
52. See id.
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The third problem, related to the second, is ineffective regulation
that has not been able to stem poaching. Although most states have
outlawed the practice of fishing for elvers,53 two states, Maine and
South Carolina, hold a commercial elver season.54 In all states,
including those without an open fishery, regulation has proved diffi-
cult to enforce because of the lucrative nature of the activity55 and
the fact that elvers are best caught at night.56 The problem is sig-
nificant enough that it has attracted the attention of the federal
government.57 
The final reason is the biology of the eel itself. Scientists believe
that eels take many years to grow to maturity.58 Thus, there is a
long time between when an eel is born and when it reproduces. Slow
maturation is generally an indicator of a species that is particularly
vulnerable to overharvesting.59 
53. Scott Calvert, Illegal Trading of Young Eels Is Investigated, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2014,
8:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303417104579546111093741486
[https://perma.cc/6KTN-X3DT] (stating that elver fishing is legal only in Maine and South
Carolina).
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
56. Bill Trotter, Elvers Fetching More Than $2,000 Per Pound, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar.
23, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2012/03/23/news/hancock/elvers-fetching-
more-than-2000-per-pound/print/ [https://perma.cc/J4EA-L35F].
57. Federal law makes it unlawful to “sell ... or purchase any fish or wildlife ... taken ...
in violation of any law ... or regulation of the United States.” 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (2012).
Federal cases concerning the illegal interstate trade of elvers are very common. See, e.g.,
United States v. Fiore, No. CRIM. 99-19-P-H, 1999 WL 33117078, at *1 (D. Me. June 3, 1999);
United States v. McDougall, 25 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88-89 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). The practice has be-
come so widespread that it has attracted the attention of the United States Department of
Justice, which has been investigating the practice throughout the Eastern Seaboard. See Jat
Field, From Poacher to Dealer: Feds Investigate Illegal Elver Trade, ME. PUB. BROADCASTING
NETWORK (May 23, 2014), http://www.mpbn.net/Home/tabid/36/ctl/ViewItem/mid/5347/ItemId/
33893/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3USX-587B].
58. See American Eel, supra note 47.
59. For example, the diamondback terrapin, once common table fare throughout the Ches-
apeake Bay region, takes an average of over five years to reach sexual maturity. See BARBARA
BRENNESSEL, DIAMONDS IN THE MARSH: A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE DIAMONDBACK TERRAPIN
20 tbl.1.2 (2006). Terrapin became popular at the end of the nineteenth century, and
overharvesting led to scarcity within thirty years of the animal’s culinary rise to fame. See
Michael W. Fincham, The Men Who Would Be Kings: How Grand Plans for the Lowly Terrapin
... Went Somewhat Awry, 7 CHESAPEAKE Q. 10, 10-14 (2008), http://www.chesapeake
quarterly.net/V07N4/main2/ [https://perma.cc/DJ4F-E5NA]. The rise and fall of the terrapin
fishery correlated with the boom and bust of the town that became the industry’s epicenter—
Crisfield, Maryland. See id. In contrast, oysters can reach sexual maturity in only one year,
and it has taken years of intensive harvesting, pollution, and disease to reduce them to 1
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In light of the creature’s fate in other parts of the world, the eel’s
decline in America is ominous. In fact, the American eel has become
the target of a concentrated harvest, largely in response to overfish-
ing in Asia and Europe.60 In 2010, the European Union banned ex-
ports of eel because stock levels were too low.61 Japanese eel stocks
have been in serious decline for decades,62 and the International
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources recently
classified the Japanese eel as endangered.63 
Because of the low stocks in Europe and Japan, the American eel
had been experiencing increased harvest.64 In 2011, however, the
problems of overfishing and poaching became particularly acute
when the Japanese earthquake and tsunami disrupted the eel fish-
ery even further.65 Combined with the European moratorium on eel
exports, these factors led to severe reductions in the global supply
of eel, which drove the market price for elvers to record levels.66 
As a result of the high market prices, harvest of elvers in Maine
reached a historic high of 21,611 pounds in 2012,67 an amount that
roughly equates to 54 million juvenile eels.68 Although Maine re-
quired a license to harvest the fish, there was no quota on the
percent of their former stock. See Oysters, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://
chesapeakebay.noaa.gov/fish-facts/oysters [https://perma.cc/J5PA-RKFT] (last visited Apr. 15,
2016).
60. See, e.g., Stéphane Ringuet et al., Eels: Their Harvest and Trade in Europe and Asia,
19 TRAFFIC BULL. 81, 84-85 (2002); Laurie Schreiber, A Wild Fishery Tamed: Maine Elvers
Are in Demand in Asia, but Quotas Limit Catch, MAINEBIZ (May 4, 2015), http://www.
mainebiz.biz/article/20150504/CURRENTEDITION/304309994/a-wild-fishery-tamed:-maine-
elvers-are-in-demand-in-asia-but-quotas-limit-catch [https://perma.cc/SHU9-5CAN] (“The
fishery took a dramatic turn in recent years due to intensified demand from Asia stemming
from declines in the European stocks that Asian eel farmers had been using.”).
61. See Sneed, supra note 5.
62. See PROSEK, supra note 4, at 119.
63. See D. Jacoby & M. Gollock, Anguilla Japonica, IUCN RED LIST THREATENED SPECIES
(2014), http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/166184/0 [https://perma.cc/CK4B-D7U7].
64. PROSEK, supra note 4, at 119.
65. See Sneed, supra note 5.
66. See id. The value of a pound of elvers was significantly lower in both 2013 and 2014,
but the value returned to 2012 levels in 2015. See Patrick Whittle, Decision Due Soon on
Whether to List American Eels as Endangered Species, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 14,
2015), http://www.pressherald.com/2015/09/14/decision-due-soon-on-whether-to-list-american-
eels-as-endangered-species/ [https://perma.cc/W8QL-JPZB].
67. See HISTORICAL MAINE ELVER LANDINGS, supra note 8. 
68. There are about 2500 elvers per pound. PROSEK, supra note 4, at 120 n.1. 
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amount that individual fishermen could catch in 2012.69 In addition,
the fine for failure to have a license was minimal.70 In the face of
little oversight, poaching was a common problem in 2012.71 
At the same time as these poaching and harvesting strains, the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) released its
2012 American Eel Benchmark Stock Assessment.72 After a lengthy
study, the Assessment concluded that “the American eel population
is depleted in U.S. waters” and found that “[t]he stock is at or near
historically low levels.... due to a combination of historical overfish-
ing, habitat loss due to damming ... mortality ... pollution ... disease,
and unexplained factors at sea.”73
The ASMFC was not the only entity to realize the dangers the eel
faced. Although the United States Fish & Wildlife Service concluded
in 2007 that it was not necessary to list the eel as an endangered
species,74 in 2011, the Fish & Wildlife Service filed a 90-day finding
on a petition to list the American eel as threatened under the En-
dangered Species Act.75 In October 2015, the Fish & Wildlife Service
announced its decision not to list the American eel as an endangered
species and noted that it is not likely to become endangered in the
near future.76 In reaching its conclusion, the Fish & Wildlife Service
looked to the destruction of habitat, the extent of commercial and
recreational fishing, the effects of disease or predation, the adequacy
69. See 2011 Me. Laws 1506 (imposing no quota limit).
70. See id. § 6404-A, H, K (amending and imposing stricter penalties).
71. Id. at 1506 (“[T]here are widespread violations in the elver fishery due to the dramatic
increase in the price per pound of elvers and harsher penalties need to be in effect to combat
the violations.”).
72. See ATL. STATE MARINE FISHERIES COMM’N, AMERICAN EEL BENCHMARK STOCK ASSESS-
MENT (May 2012), http://asmfc.org/uploads/file/americanEelBenchmarkStockAssessment
Report_May2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFA8-B9ZX].
73. Id. at 15.
74. Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Act Protection for
American Eel Not Needed (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.fws.gov/news/ShowNews.cfm?ID=74D68
E47-E43A-2F97-6C6BC67786E85454 [https://perma.cc/H4YZ-93DG].
75. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Finding on a Petition to List
the American Eel as Threatened, 76 Fed. Reg. 60,431, 60,432-33 (Sept. 29, 2011) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 90-Day Finding]. After conducting a 90-day finding,
the Fish & Wildlife Service conducts a 12-month finding, after which the Service determines
whether the species should be considered threatened. See id. at 60,444.
76. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Findings on Petitions to
List 19 Species as Endangered or Threatened Species, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,834, 60,837 (Oct. 8,
2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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of regulatory mechanisms, and other natural or manmade factors.77
Despite the Fish & Wildlife Service’s decision, the fate of the eel in
other parts of the world and the increased fishing pressure provides
reason to worry about the species’ continued success.
D. Current Status of the Passamaquoddy Tribe
Similar to the eel, the Passamaquoddy Tribe faces significant
threats to its way of life. The name for the Tribe hints at the sea-
going nature of the natives; Passamaquoddy means “pollock-plenty-
place,” in reference to a cod-like fish caught in Maine’s waters.78 The
Passamaquoddy are one of the four federally recognized tribes in
Maine.79 Other tribes include the Penobscot Tribe, the Aroostook
Band of Micmac Indians, and the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indi-
ans.80 The Passamaquoddy live in “Downeast Maine,” an area along
the northern coast of Maine.81 There are currently 3369 tribal mem-
bers listed on the tribal census rolls, with 2005 Passamaquoddy at
the Pleasant Point reservation and 1364 at the Indian Township
reservation.82 In comparison, there are only 610 Penobscot natives
living on the Indian Island reservation83 and 18,482 total natives in
Maine.84
Despite the rich natural resources of the area, Downeast has 6
percent unemployment and a median household income of $36,486.85
77. See 90-Day Finding, 76 Fed. Reg. at 60,431, 60,435-41.
78. See ME. INDIAN TRIBAL STATE COMM’N, supra note 10, at 67.
79. See Federal and State Recognized Tribes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institute/list-of-federal-and-state-recognized-tribes.aspx#
me [https://perma.cc/CNT4-96NN] (last updated Mar. 2016).
80. Id.
81. See Passamaquoddy Tribe—Pleasant Point, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY [EPA],
http://www3.epa.gov/region1/govt/tribes/passamaquoddypleasantpoint.html [https://perma.
cc/RJY9-GRG7] (last updated Apr. 14, 2016).
82. Our People, PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBE, http://www.passamaquoddy.com/?page_id=14
[https://perma.cc/3GS6-86KY] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
83. Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010, Penobscot Indian
Island Reservation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/9F6B-PXXZ.
84. TINA NORRIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE
POPULATION: 2010, at 7 tbl.2 (Jan. 2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
10.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9RB-ACMG].
85. Selected Economic Characteristics: Washington County, Maine, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://perma.cc/FH8D-N8SY (listing the economic characteristics of Washington County,
Maine in 2012).
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For the Passamaquoddy on the reservations, the statistics are far
worse: the Pleasant Point Reservation has a 23.5 percent unemploy-
ment rate and a median income of $25,769,86 and the Indian Town-
ship Reservation has an 18.3 percent unemployment rate and a
median income of $24,886.87 These statistics are similar for the
Penobscot tribe.88 Though hunting, fishing, and logging make up
only a small percentage of the Passamaquoddy’s economic activity,89
this number is higher than that for the rest of the state.90 Instead,
50.6 percent of the members on the reservations are employed in
administrative jobs, including education, health, social services, or
public administration.91 In comparison, the average unemployment
rate is 4.8 percent and the median salary is $48,219 for all citizens
of the State of Maine.92 
The Passamaquoddy are a people with a history of fishing93 and
a present economic dilemma, which has left nearly one in four na-
tives on the reservations without a job.94 It is against this backdrop
that the Tribe has pushed for greater ability to fish for elvers.95
Although the fishery could provide the Passamaquoddy with much-
86. Selected Economic Characteristics: Passamaquoddy Pleasant Point Reservation, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/8KTA-YLF6 (listing the economic characteristics of
Passamaquoddy Pleasant Point Reservation, Washington County, Maine in 2012).
87. Selected Economic Characteristics: Passamaquoddy Indian Township Reservation,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/P4A4-9WFK (listing the economic characteristics of
Passamaquoddy Indian Township Reservation, Washington County, Maine in 2012).
88. Selected Economic Characteristics: Penobscot Indian Island Reservation, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://perma.cc/PQ8X-G9H2 (listing the economic characteristics of Penobscot
Indian Island Reservation, Penobscot County, Maine in 2012).
89. Only 11.1 percent of the population is employed in these activities. See Selected
Economic Characteristics: Passamaquoddy Pleasant Point Reservation, supra note 86.
90. Only 2.5 percent of Maine’s population is employed in these activities. Selected
Economic Characteristics: Maine, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/TU39-QHBP (listing
the economic characteristics of Maine in 2012).
91. See Selected Economic Characteristics: Passamaquoddy Pleasant Point Reservation,
supra note 86.
92. Selected Economic Characteristics: Maine, supra note 90.
93. See Culture & History, PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBE, http://www.passamaquoddy.com/?
page_id=24 [https://perma.cc/YC5Y-R8VE] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
94. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Bill Trotter, Elver Dispute Between State Agency, Passamaquoddy Flares up
Again, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (May 6, 2015, 9:17 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2015/05/06/
business/state-passamaquoddy-elver-dispute-flares-up-again/ [https://perma.cc/73WL-NALP]
(“The department and the tribe have been skirmishing over the elver fishery for the past
several years.”).
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needed jobs, this employment would be short term if founded on an
unsustainable fishery. Thus, the Passamaquoddy’s desire to control
its elver fishery unencumbered by the state government runs head-
long into very real concerns about the long-term sustainability of
the elver harvest.96
II. LEGAL HISTORY OF THE ELVER FISHERY IN MAINE
This Part explores the laws regulating the fishing of elvers in
Maine. The Part begins with a brief discussion of Maine’s elver laws
as they apply within the state. It goes on to discuss the laws as they
apply specifically to Maine’s natives. It concludes with a look at the
ASMFC, an interstate governing body that has the power to impose
regulatory requirements on elver fisheries.
A. Maine Elver Legislation
The elver fishery has existed in Maine since the early 1970s.97
Due to a collapse in the price of eel, however, the harvest was non-
existent between 1979 and 1990.98 Demand resumed in the early
1990s and the fishery took off, with the price reaching upwards of
$200 per pound by the middle of the decade.99 Suddenly, what had
previously not been on the radar to most fishermen had become a
valuable fishery. 
Reflecting the fishery’s quick rise to prominence, Maine’s statutes
did not pose meaningful restrictions on the harvest. For example, it
was not until 1995 that Maine imposed a license requirement for
elver fishing.100 Later in 1995, Maine became more concerned about
the conservation of the species for “ecological and economic rea-
96. For potential solutions to this problem, see infra Part IV.
97. See The Maine Eel and Elver Fishery, ME. DEP’T MARINE RESOURCES, http://www.
maine.gov/dmr/rm/eelelver/factsheet.htm [https://perma.cc/E932-JES4] (last visited Apr. 15,
2016).
98. See id.
99. See HISTORICAL MAINE ELVER LANDINGS, supra note 8.
100. See An Act to Change the Licensing Year for Certain Marine Resource Licenses and
to Establish an Eel Fishing License, 1995 Me. Laws 991, 992 (changing the licensing year for
certain marine resource licenses and establishing an eel fishing license).
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sons.”101 Accordingly, the legislature passed an emergency law that
established stricter licensing requirements for elver fishing.102 These
requirements set fees for licenses, required the payment of addi-
tional fees depending on the quantity and type of equipment used,
and established closed seasons.103 Additionally, the law created an
“Eel and Elver Management Fund,” funded by the fees imposed on
licenses and equipment.104 The fund was set up to “research and
manage the State’s eel and elver resources and to enforce the laws
related to eels and elvers.”105
Between 1997 and 1998, the elver harvest increased from 7360
pounds to 14,431 pounds.106 The rapid change caught the attention
of the Maine legislature, which found that “the level of fishing
pressure experienced in the fishery places [the] resource at risk.”107
The new regulations limited the maximum number of pieces of gear
per license holder108 and required fishermen to report their catch to
the Department of Natural Resources.109 The law also required the
Commissioner of Marine Resources to conduct a study on the har-
vest of elvers and “make recommendations regarding any changes
to the number of licenses and gear restrictions for the 2000 elver
fishing season.”110
The following year, in response to the study, the legislature lim-
ited the number of elver licenses to 827, determined who would
qualify for a license based on participation in previous years,111 and
established a lottery for those who did not meet the qualifications.112
The price for elvers dropped below $30 per pound in the early 2000s
and remained low until the latter part of the decade, when demand
101. See An Act Regarding the Harvesting of Eels and Elvers, 1995 Me. Laws 1361, 1361
(regulating the harvesting of eels and elvers).
102. See id. sec. A-8, § 6505-A.
103. See id. sec. A-8, §§ 6505-A, 6505-B; sec. A-9, § 6575(1).
104. See id. sec. A-8, § 6505-D.
105. Id. sec. A-8, § 6505-D(2).
106. See HISTORICAL MAINE ELVER LANDINGS, supra note 8.
107. See An Act Concerning the 1999 Elver Fishery, ch. 7, 1999 Me. Laws 29, 29 (regulating
the 1999 elver fishery).
108. See id. sec. 4, § 6505-A(5).
109. See id. sec. 15, § 6864(6).
110. See id. sec. 16.
111. See An Act Regarding Elver Fishing Licenses, ch. 534, sec. 1, § 6505-A(2)(C)-(D), 1999
Me. Laws 1201, 1201 (regulating elver fishing licenses).
112. See id. sec. 1, § 6505-A(C)-(D), sec. 2, § 6505-A(2-19).
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caused prices to climb back up into the $200-$300 per pound
range.113 Importantly, harvests did not exceed 10,000 pounds an-
nually for the entire decade, falling as low as 1282 pounds in
2004.114 As a result, the legislature did not devote much time to the
fishery, apart from making some minor changes to current legisla-
tion.115
Then, as a direct result of the 2012 earthquake and tsunami in
Japan and a moratorium on the harvest of the European eel, the
price for elvers skyrocketed.116 In response, the harvest of eels jump-
ed from 8585 pounds in 2011 to 21,611 pounds in 2012.117 With
elvers selling for over $1800 per pound,118 the previous fine of “not
less than $100 nor more than $500” provided Maine’s regulations
with baby teeth.119 As a result, the legislature found it necessary to
pass new legislation in order to curb “widespread violations in the
elver fishery due to the dramatic increase in the price per pound of
elvers” by imposing “harsher penalties.”120 
In 2013, prices remained high and poaching was rampant, which
created the need for even more enforcement.121 The legislature made
a violation of the elver license requirement a strict liability crime
and kept the fine at $2000 but mandated that none of it could be
suspended.122 In addition, the law required greater reporting mea-
sures123 and mandated that elver fishermen provide law enforce-
ment with photo identification upon request.124
113. See HISTORICAL MAINE ELVER LANDINGS, supra note 8. 
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., An Act to Implement Recommendations of the MCJUSTIS Policy Board
Concerning the Drafting of Crimes and Civil Violations Pursuant to Resolve 1997, Chapter
105, as Amended, 2003 Me. Laws 1201, 1216 (drafting crimes and civil violations for various
acts).
116. See Sneed, supra note 5.
117. See HISTORICAL MAINE ELVER LANDINGS, supra note 8. 
118. Id.
119. See An Act to Sustain the Elver Fishery, ch. 549, sec. 1, § 6404-A(7), 2011 Me. Laws
1506, 1507 (increasing the fine from the previous range of $100-$500 to $2000 for violating
the section).
120. See id. at 1506.
121. See id.
122. An Act to Improve Enforcement of Marine Resources Law, ch. 468, sec. 28, § 6575-
D(1)-(2), 2013 Me. Laws 1277, 1278 (mandating the terms of violation of the elver fishing
license requirement).
123. See id. sec. 41, § 6864(13).
124. See id. sec. 9, § 6305(1-A).
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Noticeably absent from the previous regulations is a weight re-
striction. This is because prior to 2014, the only limits on the fishery
were the number of licenses and the amount of gear a fisherman
could use.125 Not surprisingly, given the unprecedented catch of 2012
and the lingering difficulties in enforcement, 2014 brought with it
further changes. The most significant of these was the implementa-
tion of an individual quota.126 The quota would be calculated based
on the landings reported in 2011, 2012, and 2013.127 Individual
quotas were to be calculated by averaging a harvester’s two highest
years in that time frame and deducting approximately 42 percent
from “the license holder’s average landings.”128 The legislature set
the minimum quota at four pounds and allocated the native tribes
2453 pounds.129 
In order to enforce the quota requirements, Maine introduced an
elver transaction card.130 The regulations require licensed elver
fishermen to present the card for every elver transaction.131 Strict
penalties ensure that fishermen comply with the transaction card
requirement.132
B. Special Elver Regulations for Maine’s Native Tribes
Since 1998, Maine’s fishing regulations have created special rules
for the native tribes. The first law applied only to the Passamaquod-
dy Tribe and allowed the tribal authority to issue its own licenses.133
License holders, however, were to comply with state regulation of
125. See supra notes 100-103, 108 and accompanying text.
126. See Act of Mar. 18, 2014, ch. 485, sec. 3, § 6302-B(2), 2013 Me. Laws 1308, 1309-10
(adding an individual quota).
127. See Individual Fishing Quotas Set for 2014 Elver Season, ME. DEP’T MARINE RE-
SOURCES, http://www.maine.gov/dmr/news/2014/2014ElverSeasonQuotas.htm [https://perma.
cc/TV9P-KSLB] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See An Act to Improve Enforcement of Marine Resources Law, ch. 468, sec. 9, § 6305(1-
B), 2013 Me. Laws 1277, 1279.
131. See id. sec. 24, § 6505-A(1-D).
132. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (disallowing sale of elvers if no transac-
tion card is present).
133. See An Act Concerning the Taking of Marine Resources by Members of the Passama-
quoddy Tribe, ch. 708, sec. 1, § 6302-A(1), 1997 Me. Laws 1823, 1824 (creating an exemption
for the Passamaquoddy Tribe).
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the fisheries.134 The law also allowed for sustenance fishing, defined
as “all noncommercial consumption” and did not include “sale of
marine organisms.”135 The rules also make it clear that the law does
not amend the Act to Implement the Maine Indian Claims Settle-
ment.136
In 2011, the Maine legislature expanded the tribal exemption to
the Penobscot Tribe.137 The law limited the Penobscot to eight
commercial licenses for elvers but allowed additional licenses “if the
commissioner determines that elver resources are sufficient to
permit the issuance of new licenses.”138 In 2012, the law added the
Aroostook Band of Micmacs.139 In 2013, the legislature included the
Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, effectively applying the tribal
exemption to all four of the federally recognized tribes.140 In 2013,
the legislature placed limits on the number of elver licenses the Pas-
samaquoddy and Houlton Band of Maliseet could issue,141 a measure
it had taken for the Penobscot in 2011142 and the Aroostook Band of
Micmacs in 2012.143 
The 2014 law retained the limit on the number of licenses al-
lowed144 but also allocated each tribe a percentage share of the total
allowable harvest in the state, of which the Passamaquoddy receive
the majority.145 Under the law, the tribes allocate the quota among
134. See id.
135. See id. sec. 1, § 6302-A(2).
136. See id. sec. 3.
137. See An Act to Provide Members of the Penobscot Nation with Marine Resources Li-
censes, ch. 137, sec. 1, § 6302-A(1), 2011 Me. Laws 192, 192-93 (expanding the availability of
marine resources licenses for members of the Penobscot Nation).
138. See id. sec. 1, § 6302-A(1)(E).
139. See An Act to Make Technical Changes to Maine’s Marine Resources Law, ch. 598,
2011 Me. Laws 1584, 1584 (creating an exemption for the Aroostook Band of Micmacs).
140. See An Act Relating to Certain Marine Resources Licenses, ch. 8, sec. 1, § 6302-A(1),
2013 Me. Laws 50, 50-51 (regulating marine resources licenses).
141. Id. sec. 1, § 6302-A(3)(E-1)-(G).
142. See An Act to Provide Members of the Penobscot Nation with Marine Resources
Licenses, ch. 137, sec. 1, § 6302-A(3)(E), 2011 Me. Laws 192, 194. The legislature later revised
the number of allowable licenses in 2013. See An Act Regarding Commercial Elver Fishing
Licenses Issued by the Penobscot Nation, ch. 9, sec. 1, § 6302-A(3)(E), 2013 Me. Laws 54, 54-
55 (limiting the number of elver fishing licenses the Penobscot can issue).
143. See An Act to Make Technical Changes to Maine’s Marine Resources Law, ch. 598, sec.
17, § 6302-A(3)(E), 2011 Me. Laws 1584, 1589.
144. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-A(3)(E)-(G) (2015).
145. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 6302-B(1) (2015). The quota allocates 14 percent to
the Passamaquoddy, 6.4 percent to the Penobscot, 1.1 percent to the Houlton Band of
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the license holders and the State issues transaction cards.146 If a
tribe exceeds its annual quota, the amount is deducted from future
allocations.147
These rules have not been without controversy, and they reflect
compromises between the tribes and state authorities. In 2013,
Maine limited the Passamaquoddy to 200 elver fishing licenses.148
Instead of obeying the law, the Tribe issued 575 licenses, of which
the State ultimately invalidated all but 150.149 After acrimonious
negotiations,150 the 2014 regulations allotted a quota for the Passa-
maquoddy of 1572 pounds.151 The Tribe begrudgingly accepted this
compromise in order to ensure that its members would be able to
participate in the fishery.152
The 2015 season brought further tensions between the Passama-
quoddy and the State. Because of a conservation-minded reduction
of the elver quota,153 the State considered and ultimately passed a
lower limit of 1356 pounds for the Passamaquoddy.154 In the middle
Maliseet, and 0.4 percent to the Aroostook Band of Micmacs. Id.
146. See id. § 6302-B(2).
147. See id. § 6302-B(3).
148. See Matthew Stone, State, Tribe Find Common Ground in Meeting, Passamaquoddy
Official Says, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, http://bangordailynews.com/2013/04/03/news/state/
passamaquoddy-officials-headed-to-capitol-to-seek-elver-solution/ [https://perma.cc/K53H-
HDTE] (last modified Apr. 3, 2013, 6:28 PM).
149. See id.
150. The spring of 2014 was marked by back and forth negotiations that ultimately ended
with the Passamaquoddy begrudgingly adopting individual quotas for its members. See Bill
Trotter, Tribes Adopt Individual Quotas as Maine’s 2014 Elver Season Begins, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, http://bangordailynews.com/2014/04/06/business/tribes-agree-to-individual-quotas-as-
2014-elver-season-in-maine-begins/ [https://perma.cc/6D6B-BKN7] (last modified Apr. 6, 2014,
5:43 PM).
151. See 13-188-32 ME. CODE R. § 32.35(C) (LexisNexis 2014). In contrast, other Maine
tribes were given significantly less. The 2014 regulations allot 713 pounds to the Penobscot
Nation, 124 pounds to the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, and 44 pounds to the Aroostook
Band of Micmac Indians. Id.
152. See Trotter, supra note 150 (“Given the dire economic problems facing tribal members
and the investment of two years in developing the elver fishery, the [T]ribe made the difficult
decision to amend their own law to assure safety for their fishers.” (quoting Joseph Socobasin,
chief of the Passamaquoddy tribe’s Indian Township)).
153. See ATL. STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMM’N, ADDENDUM IV TO THE INTERSTATE
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AMERICAN EEL § 3.1.1 (Oct. 2014) (setting Maine’s elver
quota at 9668 pounds annually and noting that the quota will be reevaluated for the 2018
fishing season). For a discussion of the ASMFC’s powers, see infra Part II.C.
154. 13-188-32 ME. CODE R. § 32.35(C) (LexisNexis 2015). These regulations allotted 620
pounds to the Penobscot Nation, 107 pounds to the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, and 39
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of the 2015 season, Maine enacted an emergency regulation because
of concerns that Passamaquoddy subsistence fishers were using
larger fyke nets to catch and sell large amounts of unrecorded el-
ver.155 Also in 2015, the state legislature rejected a bill that would
have made the elver fishery subject to concerted management be-
tween the State and the tribes.156
Maine’s tribes have challenged elver fishing regulations and will
likely continue to do so in the future, calling into question the effec-
tiveness of such regulations. This is only part of the tribes’ resis-
tance to the legislation outlining the relationship between the tribes
and Maine.157
C. The ASMFC Regulations
One of the motivations behind Maine’s increasing desire to regu-
late the elver fishery has been the lingering threat of action by the
ASMFC.158 The ASMFC has its origins in a compact between the
Atlantic states, which became effective in 1942 after Congress gave
its consent.159 Since 1942, Congress has increased the ASMFC’s
power. For example, in 1950, Congress approved amendments to the
compact that established the Commission as the governing body of
the Compact and made it permanent.160 The Compact, and the Con-
pounds to the Aroostook Band of Micmac Indians. See id.
155. DMR Implements Emergency Regulation to Protect Maine’s Elver Fishery, ME. DEP’T
MARINE RESOURCES (May 6, 2015), http://www.maine.gov/dmr/news/2015/EmergencyElver
Rule.htm [https://perma.cc/AKC8-D3CF] (“Chief Fred Moore, in a conversation with Marine
Patrol, has admitted that the [T]ribe plans to ship the eels harvested by sustenance fishermen
out of the country, a clear violation of Maine sustenance laws.”).
156. Andrew Westney, Maine Tribes Leave State Legislature Amid Acrimony, LAW360 (May
26, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/660096/maine-tribes-leave-state-legisla
ture-amid-acrimony [https://perma.cc/3ZG3-Y6VS].
157. See infra Part III.C.
158. See Sneed, supra note 5.
159. See An Act Granting the Consent and Approval of Congress to an Interstate Compact
Relating to the Better Utilization of the Fisheries (Marine, Shell, and Anadromous) of the At-
lantic Seaboard and Creating the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, Pub. L. No.
77-539, 56 Stat. 267 (1942). The original compact was between fourteen states, including Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. at art. II.
160. See Act of Aug. 19, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-721, sec. 1, 3, 64 Stat. 467, 467 (establishing
the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission as the permanent governing body of the
Atlantic Marine Fisheries Compact).
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gressional action approving it, reflect the need, even at an early
date, to ensure the protection of Atlantic fisheries.161 
In 1993, Congress granted the ASMFC the power to make and
enforce rules in the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Act of
1993.162 The Act gives the ASMFC the ability to regulate or impose
a fishing moratorium upon states that do not comply with measures
needed for conservation.163 Thus, when the ASMFC imposes stricter
regulations or a moratorium on the fishing of eels, Maine’s citizens
are required to comply or face federal penalties under the Magnu-
son-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.164 This
Commission provides the motivation behind the increasingly strict
regulations passed by Maine’s legislature. It highlights the need for
the State to demonstrate that it has the situation under control and
that it can effectively regulate all of the people within its bound-
aries. 
III. THE MAINE INDIAN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1980
The last Part discussed the legislation governing the elver fishery
in Maine, particularly as it applied to Maine’s native tribes.165
Although Maine has the ability to regulate its fisheries, the ASMFC
has jurisdiction to impose stricter regulations if necessary.166 This
looming threat undergirds Maine’s desire to have an effective and
sustainable regulatory scheme. 
Part of an effective regulatory scheme is the ability to ensure that
the state’s citizens—including the natives—comply with the law.
But does Maine have the jurisdiction to interfere with tribal matters
in this way? And if so, from where does this power derive? This Part
161. See S. REP. NO. 76-1600, at 2 (1940) (Conf. Rep.).
162. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06 (2012).
163. See id. § 5106(c)(1). The ASMFC has power over “States” as defined in the statute:
Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Virginia, and the Potomac Rivers Fisheries Commission. See id. § 5102(13).
164. See id. § 5106(f) (imposing civil penalty). The Act provides civil penalties of up to
$100,000 and criminal penalties of up to six months in prison, a fine of $100,000, or both. See
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 §§ 308(a), 309(b), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1858(a), 1859(b).
165. See supra Part II.
166. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101(a), 5103(b)(1).
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discusses MICSA and how it fundamentally altered the relationship
between the tribes and the State. This Part also delves into the
tense history of the application of the Act to fisheries.
A. Background: Federal Law and Other Precedent
The basis for the relationship between the federal government
and the native tribes within the United States is found in Article 1,
Section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”167 The intent of this provision
was to give a “broad grant of power to the federal government and
a limit on state power to interfere with federal Indian policy.”168
Congress exerted this policy-setting authority when it passed the
first of the Indian Nonintercourse Acts in 1790, which placed the
power to purchase land from native tribes solely in the hands of the
federal government.169
These broad powers mean that, unless Congress has delegated its
powers over the tribes to a state, federal law takes precedence.170
Therefore, the first step to understanding jurisdiction is to deter-
mine whether Congress has delegated its authority to a particular
state and to look closely at the legislation granting this power. Con-
gress has the ability to grant a state these powers regardless of
whether the tribes within that state have agreed to the terms.171
Although this is legally possible, it is likely that the political ramifi-
cations of such an action would be severe, meaning that Congress
rarely exercises this power. For Maine, the relationship between the
tribes and the State is outlined in an act that Congress passed in
1980, which effectuates a settlement between the two parties.172
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
168. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02, at 23 (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds., 2012).
169. See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138. The fact that the federal govern-
ment alone has the power to purchase such lands became crucially important in the case of
Maine’s tribes in the twentieth century. See infra Part III.B.
170. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 168, § 6.04, at 530
(“States generally lack civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians within Indian country,
absent federal legislation specifying to the contrary.”).
171. See id.
172. See infra Part III.B.
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B. The Settlement Acts
The Settlement Acts originated in lingering disputes over land
ownership between the natives and the State of Maine.173 At issue
was a treaty made in 1794 between the Passamaquoddy and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,174 which had not received con-
gressional approval.175 If Maine’s natives could prove that the 1794
treaty violated the Nonintercourse Act of 1790, this would open the
door to reclaiming large tracts of ancestral lands.176 Maine’s natives
pushed for restitution in the 1970s, a time that had proved to be
politically advantageous to natives throughout the United States:
several acts of Congress and court decisions demonstrated that na-
tives were gaining traction on a national level.177 As a result, natives
were eager to settle their centuries-long differences while the
political climate remained favorable to their cause. 
In the midst of the increasing attention to Indian concerns, the
Maine natives won a major victory in Joint Tribal Council of the
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton.178 In the decision, the First Circuit
determined that the Nonintercourse Act of 1790 applied to the Pas-
samaquoddy.179 The court also determined that a trust relationship
existed between the Passamaquoddy and the federal government
that had not been precluded by the long-standing relationship
between Maine and the Tribe.180 The decision paved the way for fur-
ther litigation and the potential return of 12.5 million acres from
Maine to the tribes.181 The likelihood of litigation caused President
Carter to intervene in 1977.182 
173. See generally PAUL BRODEUR, RESTITUTION: THE LAND CLAIMS OF THE MASHPEE,
PASSAMAQUODDY, AND PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF NEW ENGLAND 69-141 (1985) (describing the
history of the land disputes between the Passamaquoddy and the State).
174. See, e.g., Culture & History, supra note 93; see also 1794 Treaty Between the
Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, ME. ST. ARCHIVES, http://
digitalmaine.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=arc_docs [https://perma.cc/HS2J-
5ERL] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
175. See BRODEUR, supra note 173, at 87.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 4-7.
178. See 528 F.2d 370, 380-81 (1st Cir. 1975).
179. See id. at 380.
180. See id.
181. See BRODEUR, supra note 173, at 95-100.
182. See id.
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The result of President Carter’s intervention was the 1980 Maine
Indian Claims Settlement Act.183 The purposes of the Act were
fourfold:
(1) to remove the cloud on the titles to land in the State of Maine
resulting from Indian claims;
(2) to clarify the status of other land and natural resources in
the State of Maine;
(3) to ratify the Maine Implementing Act, which defines the rela-
tionship between the State of Maine and the Passamaquoddy
Tribe, and the Penobscot Nation[;] and 
(4) to confirm that all other Indians, Indian nations and tribes
and bands of Indians now or hereafter existing or recognized in
the State of Maine are and shall be subject to all laws of the
State of Maine, as provided herein.184
To achieve these purposes, the Act made state laws applicable to
the tribes by ratifying the Maine Implementing Act (MIA).185 Under
MIA, the laws of the State of Maine applied to Indian lands.186 MIA
also made the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot territories the equiv-
alent of municipalities.187 Additionally, MICSA effectively abrogated
prior treaties between the State of Maine and the Indian Nations,
including actions that were pending in court at the time.188
In return for this clarification, MICSA created the Maine Indian
Claims Settlement Fund, in which Congress deposited $27 mil-
lion.189 In addition, the Act created the Maine Indian Claims Ac-
quisition Fund, in which Congress deposited $54.5 million for the
purpose of acquiring land and natural resources for the tribes.190
183. See id. at 129, 131.
184. 25 U.S.C. § 1721(b)(1)-(4) (2012).
185. See id. § 1725(b)(1).
186. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6204 (2015). 
187. See id. § 6206(1) (“[T]he Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation, within their
respective Indian territories, shall have, exercise and enjoy all the rights, privileges, powers
and immunities ... and shall be subject to all the duties, obligations, liabilities and limitations
of a municipality ... and subject to the laws of the State.”). The law gives the tribes power over
“internal tribal matters.” See id.
188. See 25 U.S.C. § 1731.
189. See id. § 1724(a).
190. See id. § 1724(c).
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Both funds were held in trust for the tribes, and the Act specified
how much of each fund would go to each tribe.191 
MICSA and the accompanying state implementing act aimed to
fundamentally change jurisdictional dynamics between Maine and
the native tribes.192 In effect, tribes were not to be seen as separate
entities but as municipalities subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
Thus, when Congress passed the law, it terminated certain native
rights and gave Maine the ability to regulate certain native activ-
ities.
Important in the case of elvers, MIA, as ratified by MICSA, ap-
plied Maine’s laws to the natives.193 It made “all Indians, Indian na-
tions, and tribes and bands of Indians in the State and any lands or
other natural resources owned by them ... subject to the laws of the
State ... to the same extent as any other person or lands or other
natural resources therein.”194 Courts have upheld the notion that
the Settlement Acts changed the nature of jurisdiction. For example,
in Maine v. Johnson, the court held that “the Settlement Acts ex-
pressly divested the Maine tribes of sovereign immunity ... and with
limited exceptions, made the Maine tribes subject to the general
criminal and civil law of Maine even with respect to activities carried
out on tribal lands.”195
C. Tense History of MICSA’s Application to Fisheries
Following the passage of MICSA, several disputes have arisen
over the extent of the Act with regard to fishing rights. Since  MIA
and MICSA passed in 1980, natives have contested the application
of state law to fisheries, discrimination actions, and environmental
191. See id. § 1724(b)(1).
192. Similar settlement acts in other states fundamentally changed the relationship be-
tween those states and the tribes, establishing municipality-like status for the tribes. See, e.g.,
Natalie Landreth & Erin Dougherty, The Use of the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act to
Justify Disparate Treatment of Alaska’s Tribes, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 321, 327-30 (2012).
193. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6204 (2015). 
194. Id.
195. 498 F.3d 37, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Houlton Band of Maliseet
Indians v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 73, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the State of Maine had the
power to enforce employment discrimination laws against Maine tribes); Akins v. Penobscot
Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 483 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The relations between Maine and the Penobscot
Nation are not governed by all of the usual laws governing such relationships, but by two
unique laws, one Maine and one federal, approving a settlement.”).
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law.196 The Act has become the primary point of contention between
the tribes and the State because of its effect on tribal sovereignty.
Thus, in many respects, the resistance to state fisheries laws is
a form of social protest: a repudiation of a law that Maine’s natives
see as having collateral consequences that were not foreseen when
it was passed. In some ways, MICSA was a bad deal for the natives.
Although it brought in $81 million, this number is small in compari-
son to other settlements made with natives, and more importantly,
it required giving up certain valuable native rights.197 For example,
a consequence of MICSA was that when a Supreme Court ruling198
and an act of Congress199 gave tribes the ability to have casinos,
Maine’s tribes were excluded because MICSA specifically gave the
State the ability to legalize gaming on the reservations.200 Not only
do casinos generate large profits, but they also provide much needed
long-term jobs.201 Thus, Maine’s natives have come to see MICSA as
standing in the way of lucrative federal rights and have worked to
find a way to invalidate it. It is against this backdrop that Maine’s
natives have fought the elver regulations.
The resistance to Maine’s fishing regulations is not new. In 1998,
the defendants in State v. Beal challenged the State’s issuance of
thirteen citations to members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and
argued against the State’s ability to regulate the shellfish fishery
under MIA.202 The Passamaquoddy argued that the Acts did not ab-
196. See generally ME. INDIAN TRIBAL STATE COMM’N, supra note 10 (discussing the legal
battles over the Passamaquoddy fishing rights); see also Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians,
484 F.3d at 74-75 (applying Maine employment law to the tribes); Johnson, 498 F.3d at 42-43
(rejecting the Passamaquoddy’s argument that tribal sovereignty exempted the Tribe from
environmental law in spite of MICSA).
197. The Alaskan equivalent to MICSA gave natives 45.5 million acres of land and nearly
$1 billion. See Landreth & Dougherty, supra note 192, at 321.
198. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
199. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2012)).
200. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(I) (2012); see also Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. at 207 (“[S]tate laws may be applied to tribal Indians on their reservations if Congress
has expressly so provided.”).
201. In fact, one of the stated reasons for the legalization of Indian Gaming was to provide
“a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal govern-
ments.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
202. See State v. Beal, No. 96-957, at 1 (Me. Dist. Ct. 1998), http://www.mitsc.org/
documents/139_1998-3-27StatevBeal.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q38H-GU65].
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rogate the natives’ right to fish in their traditional waters.203 After
finding that MIA and MICSA were both “silent on the express issue
of salt-water fishing rights,” the court determined that “[w]hile salt-
water fishing is an important part of the Tribe’s history, it is not a
uniquely Indian activity.”204 The court further reasoned that “[f]ish-
ing is also of crucial importance to all citizens of Maine, and it is in
their capacity as citizens of Maine that the Implementation Act has
bound tribal members to abide by Maine’s marine resources laws.”205
At the heart of this conflict were two separate sources of law. The
first was Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, a case that found that cultur-
al considerations were not relevant when the subject matter of the
suit was not “uniquely Indian.”206 The second was Maine Revised
Statute title 30, § 6204, which applied the laws of the State to tribal
lands.207 
Therefore, the tribes’ resistance to state regulation of fisheries is
on questionable legal ground, especially for the elver fishery. The
U.S. Supreme Court has “repeatedly reaffirmed state authority to
impose reasonable and necessary nondiscriminatory regulations on
Indian hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in the interest of con-
servation.”208 In this context, it is hard to see the tribes’ actions as
anything short of illegal and contrary to the state’s legitimate
interest in preserving its fisheries stocks. It would seem that the
analysis of this entire Note should end here; under a strict reading
of the law, it would. But the idea of arresting large amounts of
natives for violating natural resources law would be politically
damning, reminiscent of not-so-distant Indian removal,209 and
expensive to prosecute, especially in the face of continued opposi-
tion. Under these circumstances, the law is without teeth, and
attempts to regulate a fishery sustainably have proven ineffective.
Compromise might be the only solution. 
Maine’s tribes might have another argument to make in favor of
their stance. A February 2015 Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) decision letter concerning the Clean Water Act provides the
203. See id.
204. See id. at 2, 10.
205. See id. at 10.
206. 461 A.2d 478, 490 (Me. 1983).
207. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6204 (2015).
208. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 205 (1999).
209. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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first real victory against MICSA and in the process has created
renewed tensions with the State.210 The EPA’s analysis suggests
that some native sovereignty rights did in fact survive MICSA.211
The EPA found that one of the purposes of MICSA was “to provide
a land base on which these Tribes could continue their unique cul-
tures” and noted that “[a] critical element of tribal cultural survival
is the ability to exercise sustenance living practices, including
sustenance fishing.”212 Thus, although the EPA determined that
Maine had the ability to regulate water quality standards, it had to
do so with the goals of MICSA in mind.213 Specifically, Maine had to
ensure that the water quality in tribal waters was such that natives
could safely eat fish that they caught.214
This understanding of MICSA could have important implications
that sweep beyond the elver fishery. The EPA’s decision, while ac-
knowledging Maine’s regulatory authority, requires Maine to take
into account tribal needs when crafting these regulations.215 The
tribe may argue, likely unsuccessfully, that the right to “sustenance
living practices” includes a commercial fishing element.216 A better
argument, however, is that the compelling interest of “tribal cul-
tural survival” might warrant allotting a greater portion of the total
elver quota in order to further the tribal economy. In this light, the
argument that the tribes need greater participation in economic
activity in order to employ their members and preserve their culture
is not a stretch under a broad reading of MICSA.
At the very least, a broad reading would require Maine to engage
in careful rethinking of its regulatory policy, perhaps even giving
natives a greater role in the decision-making process. It would pro-
vide a powerful check against Maine’s regulatory abilities. Although
210. See EPA, ANALYSIS SUPPORTING EPA’S FEBRUARY 2, 2015 DECISION TO APPROVE,
DISAPPROVE, AND MAKE NO DECISION ON, VARIOUS MAINE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS, IN-
CLUDING THOSE APPLIED TO WATERS OF INDIAN LANDS IN MAINE (2015), https://turtletalk.files.
wordpress.com/2015/02/2015-2-2-me-wqs-epa-decision-letter-attachment-a.pdf [https://perma.
cc/N4G2-YKYX].
211. See id. at 1-3.
212. See id. at 2.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 2-3.
215. See id.
216. Such an understanding would require a stretch of the traditional understanding of the
term “subsistence.” See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
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the State of Maine is likely to challenge the EPA,217 the decision
gives credence to arguments that MICSA is far from clear regarding
tribal rights.218 
The effects of this decision have caused deep rifts between
Maine’s Governor and the tribes. The Governor recently rescinded
an earlier executive order that had aimed to “[p]romote[ ] effective
two-way communication between the State and the Tribes”219 be-
cause “collaboration and communication with the tribes have proved
to be unproductive because the state of Maine’s interests have not
been respected” in the ongoing relationship between sovereigns.220
In response to the Governor’s executive order and the inability to
gain greater rights in the elver fishery, the Passamaquoddy and
Penobscot Tribes have withdrawn their delegates from the Maine
House of Representatives221 and have asked Congress to reassess
MICSA.222 Thus, the relationship between the tribes and the State
is rapidly deteriorating.
In summary, the EPA’s decision and the increasing tension be-
tween the State and the tribes suggest that there are some tribal
rights that survived MICSA. Thus, the question of the extent to
which MIA and MICSA retain aboriginal rights for Maine’s tribes
remains a contested issue. At present, the sense that MICSA was a
217. See Colin Woodward, LePage Calls EPA’s Tribal Waters Ruling ‘Outrageous’, PORT-
LAND PRESS HERALD (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.pressherald.com/2015/03/02/maine-governor-
on-epas-tribal-waters-ruling-its-an-outrage/ [https://perma.cc/78FG-LDPM].
218. Further support for reading greater rights into MICSA comes from President Obama’s
recent emphasis on tribal rights, a position that he outlined in a recent trip to Alaska in which
he also officially changed Mount McKinley back to Mount Denali, its native name. Full Tran-
script: Obama Speaks at Roundtable with Alaska Native Leaders in Anchorage, ALASKA DIS-
PATCH NEWS (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.adn.com/article/20150901/full-transcript-obama-
speaks-roundtable-alaska-native-leaders-anchorage [https://perma.cc/S8RE-VCBW] (“My ad-
ministration also is taking new action to make sure that Alaska Natives have direct input into
the management of Chinook salmon stocks, something that has been of great concern here.”).
219. See Me. Exec. Order No. 21 FY 11/12 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/
index.php?topic=Gov_Executive_Orders&id=306288&v=article2011 [https://perma.cc/9UZW-
ECF3].
220. See Nick McCrea, Maine Tribes Want Congress to Review State’s Actions, Take Fresh
Look at Settlement Act, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (May 30, 2015, 6:38 PM), http://bangordailynews.
com/2015/05/30/news/state/maine-tribes-want-congress-to-review-states-actions-take-fresh-
look-at-settlement-act/ [https://perma.cc/8PT9-6TMD].
221. See Westney, supra note 156.
222. See McCrea, supra note 220.
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bad deal,223 as well as the victory in the EPA case, have given fuel
to native resistance to state regulatory power, calling into question
the effectiveness of such laws. The ability to enforce the law is im-
portant to having an effective regulatory scheme, and Maine must
take action not only to mitigate tensions with the tribe but also to
ensure that it can continue to have lucrative fisheries. 
D. More Support for the Tribes’ Position: UNDRIP and the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) could theoretically provide support for the tribes’
position and further cast into doubt the extent to which MIA and
MICSA abrogated native rights.224 This declaration is not binding
law, but rather was intended to persuade policymakers around the
world to consider certain rights and guiding principles when making
laws affecting indigenous peoples.225 Notably, the Maine State
Legislature supported UNDRIP.226 Nicole Friedrichs, an attorney
specializing in federal Indian law, concluded that MIA and MICSA
have failed to guarantee native rights and that the UNDRIP
provides a reason to revisit MICSA.227 Although Friedrichs provides
a thought-provoking analysis that looks into whether Maine is
treating the state’s natives fairly, she fails to explore the meaning
of paragraph two, article 46 of UNDRIP,228 which states:
The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in
accordance with international human rights obligations. Any
such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly neces-
sary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
223. Although doubtless an extreme stance, one native has gone on record stating that
MICSA was “a subtle and legal form of genocide.” ME. INDIAN TRIBAL STATE COMM’N, supra
note 10, at 21.
224. See Nicole Friedrichs, A Reason to Revisit Maine’s Indian Claims Settlement Acts: The
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497
(2011).
225. See id. at 500-01.
226. See id. at 497.
227. See id. at 526.
228. See id. at 507.
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respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the
just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.229
In Maine, MIA and MICSA alter the relationship between the tribes
and the State and make state law applicable to all matters except
inter-tribal affairs.230 Thus, the question becomes whether there is
a good reason for enforcing limitations on tribal fishing rights.231 In
the case of elvers, there is a compelling interest in ensuring the
long-term viability of the fishery as well as the species.232 Further-
more, nothing in UNDRIP gives states or natives the unlimited
right to a commercial fishery, especially a right to engage in a com-
mercial enterprise to the detriment of a species’ survival.233 More
importantly, although the Passamaquoddy argue that the State has
infringed on their right to subsistence fishing because the State does
not include the right to barter or exchange, no definition of subsis-
tence fishing allows commercial fishing.234 And elver fishing, by its
nature, is almost always a commercial enterprise.235 Thus, once
again, the tribes’ argument for greater rights in the elver context
appears questionable.
229. G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at art. 46, ¶ 2
(Sept. 13, 2007) (emphasis added), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3CM-UUJU].
230. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206(1) (2015).
231. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 229.
232. See supra Part I.C.
233. See generally Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 229.
234. See DMR Implements Emergency Regulation to Protect Maine’s Elver Fishery, supra
note 155 (“[W]hen elvers are valued at $2,000 per pound they are not being caught for
sustenance, they are being caught and sold.”); see also Subsistence Definition, COLLINS ENG.
DICTIONARY, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/English/subsistence [https://perma.
cc/VQ7H-5KLT] (defining subsistence as “the means by which one maintains life”) (last visited
Apr. 15, 2016); Subsistence Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/subsistence [https://perma.cc/8TGM-PB68] (defining subsistence as “the amount
of food, money, etc., that is needed to stay alive”) (last visited Apr. 15, 2016); Subsistence
Fishing, ALASKA DEP’T FISH & GAME, http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=fishing
subsistence.main [https://perma.cc/A4SB-MJFJ] (“Subsistence uses of wild resources are
defined as ‘noncommercial, customary and traditional uses’ for a variety of purposes.”) (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016).
235. Elvers are shipped overseas where they are raised to maturity and sold to satisfy the
demand for adult eel. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, MIA and MICSA did not intend to deprive
Maine’s natives of all cultural autonomy.236 An agreement that
would achieve such an effect would likely violate the principles in
UNDRIP and be unreasonably coercive.237 In this sense, MICSA was
not simply a payoff to get the natives to submit to state authority.
One of its primary purposes and goals was to settle a long-simmer-
ing land dispute, one that threatened the long-term health of the
state because of the uncertain land title.238 In this sense, MIA and
MICSA only tangentially dealt with fisheries or jurisdiction. In
drafting MICSA, Congress may have wanted to integrate natives
into the rest of the state instead of setting them apart. Thus, part
of the $81 million payout was consideration for the natives to sub-
mit to Maine’s jurisdiction.239 But Congress may have designed
MICSA with the additional goal of making sure that the tribes
received the intended benefits of the settlement and determined
that the new jurisdictional structure was the best way to achieve
that purpose. Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that there
are lingering native sovereignty rights that MIA and MICSA did not
alter.240 This is especially true if, as one early Supreme Court case
noted, fishing rights are “not much less necessary to the existence
of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathe[ ].”241 
In summary, MIA and MICSA fundamentally changed the
relationship between the natives and the State, but numerous chal-
lenges and the recent EPA decision cast doubt on MICSA’s effects
on tribal rights. If subsistence or other indigenous rights persist,
236. See 25 U.S.C. § 1725 (2012) (enumerating the state’s power and reserving certain
authority for the native tribes); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6202 (2015) (setting out the
sovereign powers of the native tribes).
237. UNDRIP explicitly states that “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous
functions.” Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 229, art. 4.
238. See 25 U.S.C. § 1721(b)(1) (stating that one of the purposes of MICSA was “to remove
the cloud on the titles to land in the State of Maine resulting from Indian claims”); see also
supra Part III.B (arguing that the threat of lawsuits over title to certain land caused the
federal government to pass MICSA).
239. See 25 U.S.C. § 1721(b)(4) (stating that under MICSA, the tribes were subject to state
law).
240. See ME. INDIAN TRIBAL STATE COMM’N, supra note 10, at 197.
241. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). Although Winans demonstrates
the centrality of fishing in the culture of the Pacific Northwest, it dealt with the right to fish,
not the right to fish without restriction. See id. at 377.
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Maine will have difficulty enforcing not only its elver regulations,
but those regarding other natural resources as well. It is therefore
imperative that Maine find a solution to the problem. 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
The previous Part discussed the history of MIA and MICSA and
the rights of Maine’s natives. It concluded that there may be native
rights that persist despite the fact that MIA and MICSA both
clearly bring the tribes under state jurisdiction for all but “internal
tribal matters.”242 This Part examines potential solutions to the
problem and concludes with an analysis of which action is most
likely to succeed. 
A. Maintaining the Status Quo
One course that Maine could take would be to do nothing. How-
ever, continuing to manage the fishery in its current manner would
have some negative effects. The first is uncertainty. Maine has had
difficulty gaining control over the elver fishery, and the natives’
resistance to these measures creates the possibility that a signifi-
cant number of people will not obey the law, making the regulatory
system ineffective.243 The second negative consequence is the po-
tential effect on other fisheries. The natives’ resistance to Maine’s
regulation of salt-water fisheries has a long history that extends
beyond just elvers.244 This dissatisfaction is bound to create more
problems with other fisheries in the future. It will not simply go
away when the elver fishery ceases to be valuable or the eel becomes
endangered.
The third negative effect is the possibility that MIA and MICSA
violate the inherent rights of indigenous peoples.245 Although a
strong argument exists that the natives traded the right to regulate
their own fishing activities for valuable consideration,246 it remains
to be seen the extent to which the tribes contracted away their right
242. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206(1) (2015).
243. See supra Part III.C.
244. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Part III.D.
246. See supra Part III.D.
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to resources. Nevertheless, the recent EPA decision suggests that
native rights did survive MICSA to some extent.247
The most important problem with failing to take action concerns
the rapidly disintegrating relationship between the tribes and the
State. As discussed earlier in this Note, two of Maine’s four federally
recognized tribes have left the state legislature and called for the
United States Congress to revisit MICSA.248 Maine’s governor has
effectively ended negotiations with the tribes.249 This lack of commu-
nication threatens to exacerbate what is already a tense relation-
ship. A compromise must be made, not only to ensure an effective
regulatory scheme for elvers, but also to ensure the future success
of negotiations between the parties.
B. Brokering a Deal
The best possibility for Maine is to broker a deal with the tribes,
providing them with valuable consideration in exchange for an of-
ficial settlement of jurisdictional issues. One potential deal would
be to promise the tribes a certain number of permits for eel farming.
As of yet, there are no eel farms in Maine.250 The growth of a do-
mestic eel farming industry would be of great advantage to others
involved in the elver trade. A recently proposed law that would
require a $5000 elver export license would create an incentive to
develop the domestic industry.251 The license requirement adds fur-
ther fuel for a growing number of academics and business people
who question the logic of shipping elvers around the world when a
domestic eel farm would be able to participate in the highly
247. See supra Part III.C.
248. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
250. Although the idea has been proposed in the past, there have been no successful ven-
tures in Maine. See Tom Groening, Elver Farming Proposed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 4,
2000), http://archive.bangordailynews.com/2000/03/04/elver-farming-proposed/ [https:// perma.
cc/D9TR-7HGQ]; see also Tom Porter, Eel Farms in Maine? Idea is Gaining Traction, MPBN
NEWS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://news.mpbn.net/post/eel-farms-maine-idea-gaining-traction
[https://perma.cc/NN6N-VA9K].
251. Kevin Miller, Elver Exporters May Need License, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 26,
2015), http://www.pressherald.com/2015/01/26/elver-exporters-may-need-license/ [https://
perma.cc/W5HJ-T5EY].
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lucrative international trade in the animals.252 With the rising popu-
larity of eel as a food fish, and the increasing number of Asian
immigrants in America, such a proposition might prove lucrative in
the domestic market as well.253 In return for granting the permits,
the natives would agree to settle the disputes over MIA and MICSA. 
Alternatively, or if the eel becomes endangered, Maine could fund
tribal-run eel farms to boost stocks of American eel. Under this
plan, tribes would catch elvers, raise them to a certain size in cap-
tivity, and return them to Maine ecosystems. A similar plan using
eel farms is already being used in Japan to boost depleted stocks.254
This would provide the tribes with an economic boost and would also
help restore or revive the elver fishery.
The problem is that eel farms raise significant environmental
concerns. Fish farming can wreak havoc on an ecosystem, as the
practice concentrates nutrient pollutants and may lead to algal
blooms.255 Furthering this problem is the addition of drugs or
pesticides to water in order to increase farm production.256 Never-
theless, with proper oversight and regulation, such farms might
diminish the expense and environmental waste of shipping Ameri-
can eel to China and back in order to satisfy domestic demand. 
Another plausible solution might be to grant the tribes exclusive
regulatory control over certain sections of Maine rivers in exchange
for clarification of the issues with the Settlement Acts. This would
be similar to some solutions achieved on the West Coast for salmon.
Specifically, Columbia River Zone 6, a 147-mile stretch of the
Columbia River, is open only to natives for the commercial harvest
252. Proponents of eel farms discussed the possibility at the January 2015 Northeast Aqua-
culture Conference. See Porter, supra note 250.
253. In 2000, 3.6 percent of Americans were Asian. See Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/M52W-RG2Z. By 2010, this
number had risen to 4.8 percent. See Profile of General Population and Housing
Characteristics: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/VNQ7-Z86R.
254. Currently, Japan is attempting to use eel farms to breed elvers in captivity for food,
in theory making wild capture of eels unnecessary. See Winifred Bird, In Japan, Captive
Breeding May Help Save the Wild Eel, YALE ENV’T 360 (Oct. 10, 2013), http://e360.yale.edu/
feature/in_japan_captive_breeding_may_help_save_the_wild_eel/2700/ [https://perma.cc/
HRW4-5C9P].
255. See Charles Clover, Pollution from Fish Farms ‘as Bad as Sewage,’ TELEGRAPH (Sept.
19, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1355936/Pollution-from-fish-
farms-as-bad-as-sewage.html [https://perma.cc/EW74-Q6T6].
256. David Barboza, In China, Farming Fish in Toxic Waters, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/world/asia/15fish.html [https://perma.cc/FM3H-D5F6].
2322 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2287
of salmon.257 Commercial activity upstream is subject to a quota to
ensure that natives can have a viable fishery.258 Maine could set
aside certain stretches of river for natives in a similar manner. The
tribes might like this plan because it would give them some of the
autonomy that they desire. Maine might like it because the
autonomy would be limited to only certain areas. The problem with
this plan, however, is that it would require Maine to partially give
up regulatory control of a section of one or more of its rivers. In light
of the ASMFC’s increased attention to the health of the American
eel population, Maine would worry that unrestrained fishing, even
in a small area of river, could have devastating effects for the fish-
ery.
Lastly, there is the possibility that Maine could offer the natives
a lump sum or land in exchange for a formal clarification of the
issues. This is the simplest deal that could be made and would be
beneficial because it would be easier for the state than giving up
some regulatory power and less risky for the tribe than setting up
an eel farm. However, this suggestion has issues as well. Determin-
ing the amount of money or land necessary to settle the uncertain-
ties in MICSA would be very difficult and likely contentious. In
addition, political leaders may balk at the suggestion considering
the large amount of money that the U.S. government gave the tribes
in 1980. Furthermore, the mere suggestion of giving the tribes
money may further weaken any attempt to enforce MICSA in the
future should the negotiations break down. Lastly, MICSA demon-
strates that simply giving money to the tribes, without any attempt
to improve their economic condition or help them develop an ongo-
ing source of income, may be problematic.259
C. Concerted Management of the Fishery
Another less likely solution that the tribes have proposed is
concerted management of the fishery. This plan might be similar to
the one set up in Washington State following the United States v.
257. See Columbia River Zone 6, COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM’N, http://www.
critfc.org/about-us/Columbia-river-zone-6 [https://perma.cc/CF2D-PRJQ] (last visited Apr. 15,
2016).
258. See id.
259. See supra Part I.D.
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Washington decision.260 Under such a plan, both the state and the
tribe would be responsible for determining appropriate limits on the
elver harvest.261
The problem with this plan is that it would make Maine’s ability
to regulate its fishery uncertain, as the natives would likely want
few to no restrictions on their harvesting. Maine would be unlikely
to want to give up its ability to be the sole regulator of fisheries
because, in addition to being a major concession, it would also make
it more difficult to reach conclusions on fisheries management.
Having two governing bodies for regulating elvers would make it
more difficult to come to an agreement. The present disintegration
of the relationship between the tribes and the state makes such an
agreement even less likely, and the uncertainty that inaction would
produce could cost the state a valuable fishery. This is because if
Maine has difficulties regulating its fishery, it is more likely that
the ASMFC will want to intervene instead. The end result would be
the loss of a lucrative enterprise for all Mainers.
D. Appealing to the ASMFC
The tribes could come to an agreement with the ASMFC that
would either enable them to be exempted from the fishing quota the
Commission imposed upon Maine, or that would pressure Maine to
expand its elver quota for natives.262 Under this plan, the tribes
would appeal to the ASMFC to allow Maine a special native quota
that would not count toward the allowed harvest for the rest of
Maine’s citizens. 
260. See 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974); see also Rob Carson, Boldt Decision on Tribal
Fishing Still Resonates After 40 Years, NEWS TRIB. (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.courts.wa.gov/
content/PublicUpload/eclips/2014%2002%2010%20Boldt%20Decision%20on%20tribal%20fi
shing%20still%20resonates%20after%2040%20years.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M9D-AQEJ] (“The
decision had consequences for native tribes not only in Western Washington but also
throughout the United States—and to some extent for indigenous people around the world.”).
261. See Salmon & Steelhead Conservation, WASH. DEP’T FISH WILDLIFE CONSERVATION,
http://wdfw.wa.gov/conservation/salmon/co-management/ [https://perma.cc/ GD7V-JG28] (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016) (describing the cooperation between tribal and state authorities in
regulating salmon and steelhead fisheries following the United States v. Washington decision).
262. Such disparate treatment would seemingly violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. However, in Morton v. Mancari, the Court noted that a preference for feder-
ally recognized tribes was not based on racial characteristics, but rather political character-
istics. See 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
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One of Maine’s chief concerns with the elver fishery has been the
threat that the ASMFC will close down the fishery.263 Reaching a
deal with the Commission would negate that threat and allow a
narrow exception to the ASMFC’s rules. In exchange, the natives
would agree to otherwise obey Maine’s non-quota-related elver
fishing laws. This would give the natives the increased harvest that
they desire. Because of the ASMFC’s approval, Maine would rest
assured that the native harvest would not cause it to face manda-
tory decreased quotas. 
The problem with an agreement between Maine tribes and the
ASMFC would be the creation of a precedent for allowing exceptions
to its environmental regulations. The Commission would be unwill-
ing to give a special deal to Maine that might cause tribes from the
other states to demand a similar deal. The ASMFC could get around
this dilemma by making it clear that the exception is a one-time
deal and is contingent on Maine having an open elver season. This
would prevent special carve-outs for all but South Carolina, in
which elver fishing is also legal.264 Nevertheless, it is difficult to see
how this would not pave the way for further demands from other
tribes. 
Additionally, Maine’s legislature would probably not like such a
deal because it would circumvent its authority. A deal would work
around the state and could lead to further tensions. Maine might
have good reason to be wary of a separate quota for another reason:
the possibility that increased stress on the fishery would lead to
either a moratorium or the reduction in the state’s non-native quota.
Although the ASMFC has the power to set quotas, these numbers
are based on the long-term health interests of the species.265 Thus,
the ASMFC has likely set the current quota at the maximum sus-
tainable harvest level. Increasing harvest beyond this level would
subvert the purpose of the ASMFC and jeopardize the species.
Therefore, it is hard to see how any increase in the quota for tribes
would not directly take away from the allotment for non-natives.
Furthermore, even if an agreement with the ASMFC succeeded,
it would not solve all of the problems with MIA and MICSA that this
263. See Sneed, supra note 5; see also supra Part II.C (discussing ASMFC’s power to
regulate fisheries).
264. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part II.C.
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Note raises.266 The Acts would continue to create issues for the
tribes in other regulatory areas, including other fisheries. In addi-
tion, making an agreement with the ASMFC would likely fail to
ease the tensions between the tribes and the state and might actual-
ly exacerbate them.
E. Analysis
The best solution to the problem would be to broker a deal.
Regardless of the presence of jurisdictional problems in MICSA,
clarifying Maine’s ability to regulate native fisheries would intro-
duce much-needed certainty to the law. Such a deal would be valua-
ble because it would affirmatively bring Maine’s natives under its
regulatory laws. This would enable Maine to create sustainable
fisheries and prevent the appearance that the state lacks control,
negating the ASMFC’s incentive to fill a regulatory void.
The other solutions described above, although they might solve
the problem if implemented, are unlikely to occur. Maine is unlikely
to want to share its regulatory power with the tribes, and a coordin-
ated management approach might be too difficult to implement. A
compromise might arise if the state designates specific rivers or
sections of rivers to the various tribes and allows them to harvest
and sell a predetermined weight from the area. Again, this might be
best if Maine frames it as a deal, with the object of reinforcing the
jurisdictional aspects of MIA and MICSA. 
A direct appeal to the ASMFC would eliminate Maine’s concerns
that the Commission will impose harsher penalties on the state be-
cause of its inability to control native harvests. Although such a deal
might solve one of Maine’s biggest concerns, it would do little to
further the conservation goals that are necessary to ensure a sus-
tainable eel population. Furthermore, native and non-native
harvests do not operate in a vacuum. Adding to the native quota will
likely mean decreasing the non-native quota in order to ensure the
elver harvest is at a sustainable level. Lastly, and most significant-
ly, such a deal would not solve the lingering jurisdictional problems
that affect other areas of regulation. 
266. See supra Part III.B (discussing the jurisdictional authority MICSA granted Maine
over the natives).
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Thus, a deal seems to be the best option. The consideration for
such a deal does not need be inordinately expensive or even concern
elvers. It may not even concern environmental law at all. The ideas
listed above267 are only a few examples of the many possible
solutions. The deal must, however, be a beneficial compromise and
establish some degree of certainty.
The tribes will have leverage in negotiation because of one signif-
icant wrinkle: the possibility that Maine’s tribes maintain certain
indigenous rights regardless of MIA and MICSA.268 If this is the
case, then a much better deal, perhaps an amendment to the exist-
ing Acts, or even a treaty, would have to be made. This assumes,
however, that the natives can limit indigenous rights for money or
other consideration. A court might determine that such rights are
so central to the identity of the tribes that they cannot simply be
bartered away.269 If the rights are able to survive despite the specific
language of MIA and MICSA, then it is unclear that any contract or
deal could forfeit such rights. Neither Maine, the federal govern-
ment, nor the natives would want to adopt such a strong under-
standing of indigenous rights, as it would strangle both the ability
to regulate and the ability to receive payment for giving up rights.
A softer understanding would balance the needs of the tribes and
the regulatory needs of Maine, which would enable the parties to
broker a deal effectively. 
CONCLUSION
The elver’s rise to prominence has led to increased questions
about the fishery’s long-term stability.270 The conflict between
Maine’s tribal and state authorities poses difficulties in creating
effective means of managing the resource. Although MIA and
MICSA make state laws applicable to Maine’s tribes and give them
municipality status, significant questions remain over the extent to
which the tribe contracted away their resource rights in MIA and
MICSA.271 Thus, Maine’s best option is to craft a deal that clarifies
267. See supra Part IV.A-D.
268. See supra Part III.D.
269. See, e.g., supra note 241 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Part I.C.
271. See supra Part III.D.
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the Settlement Acts and enables the state to regulate its fishery
effectively and prevent the end of a valuable commercial enterprise.
This would enable Maine to regulate not only eels, but also any
overharvested or at-risk species. The controversy over elvers is not
simply about eels, but it is instead an offshoot of larger jurisdic-
tional questions in the wake of MIA and MICSA. The Settlement
Acts have left lingering questions about jurisdiction. Thus, a clar-
ification would have benefits in other areas of the law as well. 
Moreover, as the confrontation between a former Passamaquoddy
official and New York authorities discussed at the beginning of this
Note suggests, the controversy over elver fishing rights is not strict-
ly a Maine concern.272 It is part of a larger issue over the proper
balance between state regulatory authority and the rights of
American Indians. Although the law governing these relationships
is different depending on the state, tribe, and circumstances, the
underlying conflict is the same: determining the rights of indigenous
peoples in a modernized economy and dealing with the effects of a
history of discrimination and economic depression. 
The twenty-first century has been one in which people throughout
the globe have realized the limits of the natural world. As govern-
ments deal with the finite nature and impending exhaustion of
resources upon which economies depend, indigenous peoples can
often get lost in the shuffle. The question becomes what to do when
an urgent need for regulation meets thousands of years of cultural
tradition. Guilt plays a role here, because the dams, pollutants, and
unregulated fishing of the majority has led to a decreased bounty for
the original inhabitants.273 This guilt is a continuing motivation in
the tribal-state relationship, and it is something that the Settlement
Acts did not and could not extinguish. Against the background of
this guilt, Maine, and other states like it, must walk a thin line
between ensuring sustainability, providing for the economy, and
respecting the dignity of the first Americans. The boundary is
murky and requires elucidation through occasional compromise. As
the conflicts between Maine and its tribes show, the time has come
to reassess MICSA and give it the certainty necessary to create
effective regulations. More than the success of the eel and the
272. See Lawlor, supra note 1.
273. See supra Part I.C.
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lucrative elver fishery is at stake; the health of Maine’s natural
resources and native tribes depends on such reassessment.
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